Health Care Access for Children with Disabilities by Fentiman, Linda C.
Pace University
DigitalCommons@Pace
Pace Law Faculty Publications School of Law
1-1-1999
Health Care Access for Children with Disabilities
Linda C. Fentiman
Elisabeth Haub School of Law at Pace University, LFentiman@law.pace.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/lawfaculty
Part of the Health Law and Policy Commons, and the Juvenile Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at DigitalCommons@Pace. It has been accepted for inclusion in Pace Law
Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Pace. For more information, please contact cpittson@law.pace.edu.
Recommended Citation
Linda C. Fentiman, Health Care Access for Children with Disabilities, 19 Pace L. Rev. 245 (1999), http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/
lawfaculty/325/.
Health Law Symposium Articles 
Health Care Access for Children 
with Disabilities 
Linda C. Fentiman* 
I. Introduction 
In the last twenty-five years, we have seen a remarkable 
evolution in attitudes and practice toward the treatment of chil- 
dren with disabi1ities.l Children born with severe physical and 
mental anomalies are no longer routinely allowed to die. Many 
such children, along with those who become disabled later in 
childhood through illness or injury, receive aggressive life-sav- 
ing medical treatment as well as continuing medical and 
habilitative care. Some children, particularly those whose fami- 
lies are affluent, receive substantial therapeutic and other sup- 
portive services that permit them to overcome their disabilities 
and function effectively in school and, later, at work.2 
- - 
* Linda C. Fentiman is Professor of Law and Director of the Health Law and 
Policy Program at Pace University School of Law. She holds a B.S. from Cornell 
University, J.D. from S.U.N.Y. Buffalo Law School, and LL.M. from Harvard Uni- 
versity School of Law. 
The author is grateful to her colleague Josh Greenburg for his helpful advice 
and comments. She is also thankful for the dedicated research assistance she re- 
ceived from two Pace University Law School students, Marleen Kelley, Class of 
1999, and Lloyd Cohen, Class of 2000. 
1. Studies indicate that nearly 7% of all American children have some form of 
mental or physical disability, including physical disabilities like cerebral palsy, 
chronic illnesses like AIDS, birth defects like spina bifada, cognitive disorders like 
mental retardation, behavioral disorders like autism and attention deficit hyperac- 
tivity disorder, and mental illnesses like schizophrenia. See Dorothy K. Doolittle, 
Welfare Reform: Loss of Supplemental Security Income SSZ for Children with Disa- 
bilities, 3 J .  OF THE SOC'Y OF PEDIATRIC NURSES 33 (Jan. 12, 1998). 
2. Schools are also becoming more adept at integrating disabled children into 
the classroom and providing supportive services for them, acting under the man- 
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Even though the approaches to treatment of disabled chil- 
dren have changed significantly during the last quarter cen- 
tury, the fundamental legal, ethical, and resource allocation 
issues remain constant. These are the complex and intertwined 
issues of authority, autonomy, and advocacy. Authority is the 
legal and moral power of parents, physicians, and the govern- 
ment to make decisions about disabled children's access to 
health care. Autonomy involves the practical ability of parents, 
physicians, and others, to  make such decisions alone, free from 
outside interference. Advocacy, of course, is giving voice to a 
particular child, or a group of disabled children, who seek access 
to  high quality health care. 
Problems of access arise in two major contexts: access to 
acute medical treatment, including urgent and emergent care, 
and access to continuing medical, habilitative and supportive 
services. The paradigmatic acute care cases are those involving 
severely disabled newborns - Baby Doe in Indiana,3 Baby Jane 
Doe in the University Hospital case,4 Baby "K" in Virginia,s and 
Baby Terry in Michigan.6 In these cases, the primary focus of 
analysis has been on parents' capacity and power to make ap- 
propriate health care decisions for their children, when their 
authority to  do so has been challenged by physicians, hospitals, 
or the government. Other notable cases have arisen when chil- 
dates of the Individuals with Disabilities in Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 
$8 1400-1491 (1996), and Q 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,29 U.S.C. Q 701 et 
seq. (1998). Detailed exploration of this subject is beyond the scope of this article. 
However, i t  is noteworthy that the Supreme Court has recently granted certiorari 
in Cedar Rapids Community School District v. Garrett, 106 F.3d 822 (8th Cir. 
1997), cert. granted, 118 S. Ct. 1793 (1998), a case holding that the IDEA requires 
school districts to pay for full-time nursing services a t  school which are "required 
to assist a child with a disability to benefit from special education." Id. at 824 
(quoting 20 U.S.C. Q 1401(a)(17) (1996)). 
3. See JEFF LYON, PLAYING GOD IN THE NURSERY 21-58 (1985). 
4. United States v. Univ. Hosp., State Univ. of New York a t  Stony Brook, 729 
F.2d 144 (2d Cir. 1984). 
5. In the Matter of Baby "K," 16 F.3d 590 (4th Cir. 1994), a f f g  and modifying 
In the Matter of Baby "K," 832 F. Supp. 1022 (E.D. Va. 1993). 
6. In re Achtabowski, No. G93-142173-GD (Mich. P.Ct. July 30, 1993), No. 93- 
1247-AV (Mich. Cir. Ct. Aug. 12, 1993), leave to appeal denied, 548 N.W.2d 628 
(Mich. 1995), discussed in James Bopp Jr.  & Richard E. Coleson, Child Abuse by 
Whom? Parental Rights and Judicial Competency Determinations: The Baby K and 
Baby Teny Cases, 20 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 821, 825 (1994). 
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dren become candidates for aggressive medical care, and their 
parents do not want to pursue it.7 
The second cluster of cases involves access to care on a con- 
tinuing or chronic basis: gaining access to appropriate medical 
specialty care and appropriate habilitation services, and inte- 
grating medical and other services in order to maximize a 
child's opportunities for effective functioning. Chronic disabil- 
ity cases are much more numerous than the headline-grabbing 
acute care cases, and usually do not involve dramatic "life and 
death" decisions. Instead, disputes usually raise two types of 
issues: (1) whether services are related to a medical condition, 
and thus are medically necessary, and (2) whether a child's disa- 
bilities are sufficiently severe to meet government criteria for 
financial assistan~e.~ 
Eligibility for federal Supplemental Security Income (SSI)g 
benefits for poor, disabled children is particularly valuable be- 
cause it guarantees its recipients access to  Medicaid, the fed- 
eral-state partnership that pays for medical services for certain 
categories of low income individuals.10 In addition, SSI pro- 
vides a cash benefit to families of disabled children, which is 
critical in permitting poor families to buy necessary supportive 
products and services, such as state of the art wheelchairs, nu- 
tritional supplements, and other items not covered by Medicaid. 
The cash benefit also allows parents of disabied children to  
purchase child care services that permit them to work more 
7. See, e.g., In re Hudson, 126 P.2d 765 (Wash. 1942) (holding that there was 
no basis for overruling parental refusal to consent to medically recommended am- 
putation of deformed arm, absent demonstration that parent was unfit to make 
decision); In re Custody of a Minor, 393 N.E.2d 836 (Mass. 1979) (finding that 
three year old child suffering from leukemia was in need of state care and protec- 
tion where, against medical advice, his parents discontinued chemotherapy and 
substituted treatment with laetrile); Walker v. Superior Court, 763 P.2d 852 (Cal. 
19881, cert. denied, 491 U.S. 905 (1989) (holding that mother could be prosecuted 
for involuntary manslaughter and felony child endangerment aRer she treated her 
child with prayer rather than Western medicine, despite a faith healing exemption 
in the misdemeanor child neglect statute). 
8. See, e.g., Nelson v. Apfel, 131 F.3d 1228 (7th Cir. 1997). 
9. The Supplemental Security Income Program guarantees minimal cash 
assistance and access to medical care to disabled adults and children. See 42 
U.S.C. 3 1381 et seq. 
10. See Overview of the Medicare and Medicaid Programs: Medicare and 
Medicaid Statistical Supplement, 1997, 18 HEALTH CARE FIN. REV. 1 (1997), avail- 
able in 1997 WL 18242940. 
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hours, and thus, try to bring the family out of poverty.ll By 
1995, nearly one million poor American children received cash 
assistance through the SSI program because they were dis- 
abled.12 This number has been drastically reduced since Con- 
gress enacted the Personal Responsibility and Work 
Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996.13 As part of a broad 
overhaul of American social welfare law, this Act altered both 
the criteria and the process for determining eligibility for SSI 
benefits due to childhood disability, excluding many children 
with moderate disabilities from the SSI program, particularly if 
their disabilities were behavioral or emotional.14 Exclusion also 
threatened to  deny these children benefits under the Medicaid 
Act,l5 but Congress reversed itself in the Balanced Budget Act 
of 1997,16 which restored Medicaid eligibility for disabled chil- 
dren who had been cut from SSI by the 1996 law.17 
Disability cases also shine a spotlight on the medical versus 
habilitative distinction that pervades the United States health 
care system, which generally provides and pays for care within 
the framework of the medical model. The medical model is 
predicated on treatment for an injury or illness, designed to 
lead to restoration and recovery to a previously existing "nor- 
mal" status. In contrast, the disabilities model is organized 
around a child's "condition," for which treatment and services 
are provided focusing on developmental progression and attain- 
ment. Medical necessity disputes arise out of the health care 
reimbursement system's historical reliance on physicians as 
gatekeepers, who, in this role, designate patients as ill or in- 
jured and in need of acute or chronic health care. This focus on 
medically oriented definitions of impairment frequently leads to 
the drawing of arbitrary distinctions between "medical" care, 
11. See Adam Piori, Losing a Lifeline: Disability Cutbacks Imperil Children's 
Health, BERGEN COUNTY RECORD, Feb. 15, 1998, at Al.  
12. See Lema Kennedy, SSA Programs that Benefit Children (Social Security 
Administration), 59 Soc. SEC. BULL. 64 (Sept. 1996), available in 1996 WL 
11547698; see also Doolittle, supra note 1, at 38. 
13. Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996). 
14. See id. 8 211. 
15. 42 U.S.C. 3 1396a et seq. (1998). 
16. Pub. L. No. 105-33, 111 Stat. 251 (1998) (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
17. See Doolittle, supra note 1, at 40; see also Balanced Budget Act of 1997, 
Pub. L. No. 105-33, 111 Stat. 251 (1997). 
Heinonline - -  19 Pace L. Rev. 248 1998-1999 
19991 CHILDREN WITH DISABILITIES 249 
which is covered by a government or private payor, and 
"habilitative" or "custodial" care, which is not.18 Disputes about 
eligibility for government payment for habilitative and other 
services for disabled children are often an outgrowth of this 
medically based approach to providing services. They also re- 
flect a profound lack of understanding of, and skepticism about, 
the nature of disabilities, particularly where children are 
concerned. 
11. Autonomy, Authority, and Advocacy 
What links these two groups of children's access cases are 
the concepts of autonomy, authority, and advocacy. The auton- 
omy principle raises the question: Under what circumstances 
should parents be left alone, free from interference from health 
care professionals, the government, and third-party payors, to 
make decisions about what treatment is most appropriate for 
their child? For most lawyers, and many parents, autonomy is 
the preeminent principle, trumping all other considerations. 
The authority principle asks: Who is legally authorized to 
make decisions on behalf of a disabled child, and under what 
circumstances should it be someone other than the child's par- 
ents - the government, physicians, or other health care provid- 
ers - who has the finai say? Authority issues arise in a wide 
range of circumstances, including decisions about proposed 
medical treatments,lg and access to habilitative services and 
other resources necessary to  maximize a disabled child's 
functioning. 
The concept of advocacy cuts across the principles of auton- 
omy and authority. Here we are asking: Who speaks for the 
18. See, e.g., RAND E. ROSENBLATT ET AL., LAW AND THE AMERICAN HEALTH 
CARE SYSTEM 1151 (1997) (discussing long term care). 
19. These cases raise not only the question of what medical treatment is nec- 
essary, but where it should be provided, and who should pay for it. See, e.g., In re 
Baby "K," 16 F.3d 590 (4th Cir. 19941, affg and modifying In re Baby "K," 832 F. 
Supp. 1022 (E.D. Va. 1993) (upholding the right of a mother of an anencephalic 
baby to insist that it receive life-saving respirator treatment when brought to a 
hospital emergency room); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979) (upholding parents' 
rights to commit their mentally ill children to a state mental hospital without judi- 
cial review of the commitment decision); Detsel v. Sullivan, 895 F.2d 58 (2d Cir. 
1990) (holding that Medicaid must pay for skilled nursing care necessary to permit 
a severely disabled child to attend public school). 
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child - the parents or other legal representative, health care 
professionals, or the government, either individually or in 
combination? 
111. Access to Acute Care 
A review of acute care treatment decisions for disabled chil- 
dren shows a remarkable swing of the pendulum in the last 
twenty-five years. Treatment has moved from deliberate non- 
action, to aggressive medical intervention, to a more recent re- 
examination of the appropriateness of deploying high technol- 
ogy solutions in all cases. 
In 1973, Raymond Duff and A.G.M. Campbell launched a 
firestorm of controversy with an article that acknowledged pub- 
licly what was commonly known among pediatricians: that in 
some cases, physicians and families considered it appropriate, 
and indeed superior, to withdraw or withhold medical treat- 
ment from disabled newborns, rather than insisting on aggres- 
sive treatment which would likely be painful, might ultimately 
prove futile, and would in any case permit a child to live who 
was expected to have a very poor quality of life.20 In 1979, Rob- 
ert and Peggy Stinson published an agonizing account of the 
tragic life of their extremely premature son, which vividly 
dramatized the consequences of denigration of parental auton- 
omy and authority and its replacement with untrammeled phy- 
sician authority and a commitment to pushing the outside of 
the envelope.21 The Stinson's son, "Baby Andrew," was treated 
over their objections in a neonatal intensive care unit for six 
months, until physicians finally decided that his case was in- 
deed hopeless, and permitted him to die.22 
IV. The "Baby Doe" Cases 
"Baby Doe'' was a highly publicized case which made visible 
the conflict between parents who sought to make a "quality of 
20. See Raymond Duff & A.G.M. Campbell, Moral and Ethical Issues in the 
Special Care Nursery, 289 NEW ENG. J. MED. 890 (1973), reprinted in JUDITH 
AREEN ET AL., LAW, SCIENCE AND MEDICINE 1169 (1984). 
21. See Robert Stinson & Peggy Stinson, On the Death of a Baby, 244 THE 
ATLANTIC 64 (July 1979); see also ROBERT STINSON & PEGGY STINSON, THE LONG 
D ~ N G  OFBABY ANDREW (1983). 
22. See id.  
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life" decision for their disabled child and a physician who tried 
to  insist on aggressive medical in ter~ent ion.~~ "Baby Doe" was 
born in Bloomington, Indiana, in 1982 suffering from Down 
Syndrome (a condition that always involves mild to severe 
mental retardation), apparent circulatory and neurological im- 
pairments, and esophageal atresia (a gap between the esopha- 
gus and stomach that prevents ingested food from reaching the 
stomach).24 If the esophageal atresia was not surgically cor- 
rected, the baby would have starved to death.25 The parents de- 
cided, after consulting with their obstetrician and pediatrician, 
that their child would have such a poor quality of life due to 
Down Syndrome and his other disabilities, that it would be 
wrong for him, his parents, and his older siblings to agree to  the 
necessary ~urgery.~6 The parents' decision was challenged by 
another pediatrician and the local prosecutor, but the parents' 
right to decide what was best for their child, given conflicting 
medical opinions, was upheld first by a lower court, and then by 
the Indiana Supreme Court.27 Baby Doe died six days after 
birth.28 
The enormous publicity surrounding this case caused an 
outcry by disability rights and "right to life" advocates. In 1983, 
in response to  this case, the "Baby Doe" regulations were 
promulgated on an "interim final" basis by the Reagan Adminis- 
tration, under the authority of 9 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 
1973.29 These regulations prohibited hospitals from discrimi- 
nating on the basis of a handicap in providing medical treat- 
ment to seriously ill newborns (i.e., not treating children with 
disabilities when they would have treated a non-disabled 
child).30 The regulations focused primarily on the process by 
which potential cases of medical neglect should be handled by 
state child abuse authorities, but they also significantly ex- 
panded the federal government's role in overseeing and investi- 
gating medical treatment decisions for severely disabled 
23. See LYON, supra note 3, at 24-25. 
24. See id. 
25. See id. 
26. See id. 
27. See id. 
28. See LYON, supra note 3, at 28-38. 
29. See 45 C.F.R. pt. 84, App. C. (1998). 
30. See id. 
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newborns.31 The regulations established a "Handicapped Infant 
Hotline," and required hospitals receiving federal funds to post 
signs in all infant care settings, warning "Discriminatory Fail- 
ure to Feed and Care for Handicapped Infants in this Facility is 
Prohibited by Federal Law."32 So called "Baby Doe Squads" 
would descend upon hospitals where discriminatory denial of 
treatment was suspected, often based upon the report of a nurse 
or relative of a seriously ill newborn, and launch an inquiry into 
the child's ~ a s e . ~ 3  On occasion, the federal investigative process 
worked so quickly that federal authorities arrived at a hospital 
even before a treatment decision had been made.34 
Ultimately, the "Baby Doe" regulations were struck down 
as having exceeded the Congressional grant of authority in 
$ 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.35 The regulations were 
first invalidated in American Academy of Pediatrics v. Heckler,36 
in which the Federal District Court for the District of Columbia 
agreed with a facial challenge to the hastily published regula- 
tions, and held that the regulations were adopted in violation of 
the Administrative Procedure Act.37 
In 1984, in United States v. University Hospital,38 the Sec- 
ond Circuit Court of Appeals found that the Rehabilitation Act 
did not authorize the government to compel access to  the Medi- 
caid records of a handicapped infant.39 This case involved the 
federal government's attempt to intervene in the medical deci- 
sion-making process in the case of a particular child, Baby Jane 
Doe, who was born with multiple congenital anomalies, includ- 
31. See id. 
32. Id. a t  9631. In pertinent part, Q 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 pro- 
vides that, "No otherwise qualified handicapped individual . . . shall, solely by rea- 
son of his handicap, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits 
of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving fed- 
eral financial assistance." 29 U.S.C. Q 794 (1973). 
33. See LYON, supra note 3, at 42-43; see also United States v. Univ. Hospital, 
State Univ. of New York at Stony Brook, 729 F.2d 144 (2d Cir. 1984). 
34. See Bowen v. The Am. Hosp. Ass'n, 476 U.S. 610, 635-636 (1986). 
35. See Am. Academy of Pediatrics v. Heckler, 561 F. Supp. 395 (D.D.C. 1983) 
(citing Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. Q 553 et seq. (1996)). 
36. 561 F. Supp. 395. 
37. See id. a t  400-03. 
38. 729 F.2d 144 (2d Cir. 1984). 
39. Id. a t  160-61. 
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ing spina bifada,40 mi~rocephaly,~~ and hydro~ephalus.~~ Be- 
cause of these conditions, it was expected that she would be 
mentally retarded, and might have a short life.43 After consult- 
ing with physicians at University Hospital in Stony Brook, New 
York, the parents elected to forego surgery to correct the spina 
bifada and hydrocephalus, and instead chose to undertake more 
conservative, comfort-based treatment, which was less likely to 
prolong her life.44 
The University Hospital case was widely publicized when a 
Vermont attorney, who was unknown to the family, initiated an 
action in New York State court to compel the hospital to under- 
take the more aggressive course of treatment.45 Although he 
succeeded at the trial court level, that decision was reversed on 
a~peal.~6 The New York Court of Appeals held that an unre- 
lated person had no authority to seek judicial intervention in a 
private medical decision.47 
Concurrently, the United States Department of Health and 
Human Services (HHS) sought to review Baby Jane Doe's medi- 
cal records, in order to determine if the decision to pursue less 
aggressive medical care violated the "Baby Doe" reg~lat ions ,~~ 
and thus, 8 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.49 When the hospital 
refused the HHS request, the United States brought suit in the 
Federal District Court for the Eastern District of New York. 
The district court found that University Hospital had not 
discriminatorily failed t.0 treat Baby Jane Doe, because it was 
the parents, and not the hospital, who decided not to conduct 
the surgery.50 Furthermore, the court emphasized the reasona- 
40. Spina bifida is a "congenital defect in which part of the meninges or spinal 
cord protrudes through the spinal column, often resulting in neurological impair- 
ment." RANDOM HOUSE UNABRIDGED ICTIONARY 1838 (1993). 
41. Mircrocephaly is a condition in which the child's skull is unusually small. 
See id.  at 1214. 
42. Hydrocephalus is an accumulation of fluid within the skull which often 
causes great enlargement of the head. See id. 'at 937. 
43. See Univ. Hosp., 729 F.2d at 146. 
44. See id. 
45. See Weber v. Stony Brook Hosp., 60 N.Y.2d 208, 456 N.E.2d 1186, 469 
N.Y.S.2d 63 (1983). 
46. See id. 
47. See id. 
48. See University Hospital, 729 F.2d at 147-48. 
49. 29 U.S.C. 5 794 (1973). 
50. See Univ. Hosp., 729 F.2d at 149. 
Heinonline - -  19 Pace L. Rev. 253 1998-1999 
254 PACE LAW REVIEW Wol. 19:245 
bleness of the parents' decision in light of "'due consideration of 
the medical options available and on a genuine concern for the 
best interests of the child.'"51 On appeal, the Second Circuit 
Court of Appeals held that $ 504 of the Rehabilitation Act was 
never intended to involve the federal government in medical 
treatment decisions for seriously ill newb0rns.5~ 
The case of Bowen v. The American Hospital Association53 
involved a facial challenge to  the "Baby Doe" regulati0ns.5~ In 
Bowen, a plurality of the Supreme Court agreed with the Sec- 
ond Circuit's view that the "Baby Doe" regulations were 
promulgated in excess of the authority granted by $504 of the 
Rehabilitation Act.55 The Supreme Court reviewed the history 
of the "Baby Doe" regulations, and found no evidence that hos- 
pitals were discriminating against disabled newborns by with- 
holding treatment, because whenever treatment was not 
provided, it was because the parents had not consented.56 The 
Supreme Court concluded that there was no basis for the Secre- 
tary of Health and Human Services' decision to invoke $ 504's 
prohibition against federally funded facilities discriminating on 
the basis of handicap.57 Instead, the Court found that state 
child abuse agencies were providing ample protection against 
the medical neglect of disabled newborns and had intervened to 
seek judicial authorization of medical treatment when 
necessary.58 
What are the lessons of the Baby Doe cases? An initial ex- 
amination of these cases reveals that the courts affirmed the 
ability of parents to decide what was appropriate medical care 
for their children, so long as the parents had consulted with 
medical professionals, and had gained some medical support for 
their decision. These decisions, from Baby Doe in Bloomington, 
Indiana, to Baby Jane Doe in Stony Brook, New York, to  
Bowen's invalidation of the "Baby Doe" regulations in their en- 
51. Id. (quoting United States v. Univ. Hosp., 575 F. Supp. 607,615 (E.D.N.Y. 
1983)). 
52. See id. at 161. 
53. 476 U.S. 610 (1986). 
54. See id. at 613. 
55. See id. at 647. 
56. See id. at 610. 
57. See id. at 646. 
58. See Bowen, 476 U.S. at 639. 
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tirety, can be seen as affirming parental autonomy and author- 
ity. The decisions also uphold the authority of physicians and 
other health care providers to guide parents through difficult 
health care decisions, free from outside interference. The gov- 
ernment was permitted to intervene only in extreme cases of 
medical neglect and child abuse (where, presumably, physicians 
disagreed with parents about the appropriate treatment ap- 
proach), and then it was the state, not federal government that 
was held to have authority to second guess the parents' 
decision. 
On a deeper level, however, the apparent recognition of pa- 
rental autonomy and authority in the Baby Doe cases may be 
illusory. In reality, only in cases where the doctors agreed with 
the parents were the parents' choices affirmed.59 In other cases, 
where the physicians believed that treatment should be given, 
the parents' authority was overruled, and they were either ig- 
nored, as were the Stinsons in the case of Baby Andrew,GO or 
reported to  state child abuse authorities as noted in B ~ w e n . ~ l  
Thus, in truth, the Baby Doe decisions vindicated physician, not 
parental autonomy and authority. 
V. The Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment and Adoption 
Reform Act 
Even as challenges to the "Baby Doe" regulations were 
wending their way through the federal courts, Congress was 
acting to  provide the authority for federal involvement in medi- 
cal decision-making for seriously ill newborns which was al- 
leged to be lacking in 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. As part of 
a broad concern with child abuse and adoption and the lack of 
adequate resources to  investigate and prosecute cases of abuse, 
Congress sought to  ensure that uniform federal standards 
would be used in cases of medical neglect. Congress offered a 
carrot-and-stick approach: a promise to supply more financial 
resources to state child abuse programs if states would adopt 
sweeping definitions of medical neglect, which were directly fo- 
cused at disabled newborns. Under the 1984 amendments to 
59. See, e.g., LYON, supra note 3, at 21-58; United States v. Univ. Hosp., 729 
F.2d 144 (2d Cir. 1984). 
60. See sources cited supra note 21. 
61. See Bowen, 476 U.S. at 635. 
Heinonline - -  19 Pace L. Rev. 255 1998-1999 
256 PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 19:245 
the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment and Adoption Re- 
form Act ("the Child Abuse Prevention and the regula- 
tions promulgated under it in 1985,63 "medical neglect" was 
defined as: 
The withholding of medically indicated treatment unless: 
i) the infant is chronically and irreversibly comatose; 
ii) the provision of such services would merely prolong dying and 
not be effective in ameliorating all of the infant's life threatening 
conditions, or otherwise be futile in the survival of the infant; or ' 
iii) the provision of such treatment would be virtually futile in 
terms of the survival of the infant and the treatment itself under 
such circumstances would be inhumane.64 
The regulations further mandated that nutrition, hydra- 
tion, and medication always be provided.65 This directly ad- 
dressed the situation frequently at issue in the Baby Doe cases, 
where the medical treatment involved the provision of correc- 
tive surgery to permit nutrition and hydration, and a decision 
not to treat often included the withholding of food and fluids. 
The Child Abuse Prevention Act was a delicately crafted polit- 
ical compromise. I t  involved negotiations among representa- 
tives of the American Academy of Pediatrics, right to life and 
disability advocacy groups, and HHS, who sought to identify 
common ground on which there was agreement that no medical 
treatment should be provided. 
The common ground, however, was extremely sparse, and 
the inherent ambiguity and subjectivity in such terms as 
"merely prolong dying," "futile," and "inhumane" have had a sig- 
nificant impact on the practice of medicine in hospital delivery 
rooms and neonatal intensive care units. Several studies have 
indicated that in the wake of the "Baby Doe" regulations and 
the 1985 Child Abuse regulations, physicians and other health 
care professionals have become much more aggressive in their 
treatment of extremely premature, low birth weight infants, or 
other infants born with severe and multiple anomalies, fearing 
62. Pub. L. No. 98-457, 98 Stat. 1749 (1984). 
63. 45 C.F.R. 49 1340.1 - 1340.20 (1998). 
64. 45 C.F.R. 8 1340.15(b)(2). 
65. See id. 
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that to do otherwise would provoke federal or state 
in ter~ent ion.~~ 
Thus, Congress succeeded where HHS did not, in imposing 
federal substantive standards for the medical treatment of chil- 
dren born with severe disabilities.67 These standards froze 
medical standards in the mid-19807s, unable to evolve with 
medical and scientific advances in the last fifteen years. They 
also directly limit physician autonomy and authority to make 
medical treatment decisions for seriously ill newborns, and indi- 
rectly constrain parental autonomy and authority as well, by 
limiting the options that physicians can provide to parents in 
discussing their child's condition and prognosis. 
VI. Baby K and Baby Terry 
In two cases in the 19907s, courts have again been called 
upon to  decide whether parents or physicians have the author- 
ity to decide the course of a disabled child's medical treatment. 
The results have been inconsistent. In one case, courts upheld 
the right of a mother of a severely disabled infant to insist on 
medical treatment, while in the other, courts found that parents 
who insisted on treatment over the objections of the baby's doc- 
tors were incompetent to make medical treatment decisions. In 
In re Baby "K,"68 two federal courts addressed the question of 
whether the mother of an anencephalic child could insist on 
medical treatment that a hospital's physicians believed to be fu- 
tile, and therefore inappropriate.69 After Baby "K" was born, 
she was diagnosed as anencephalic (lacking major portions of 
her brain, skull, and scalp, and as a result, permanently uncon- 
s c i o ~ s ) . ~ ~  Believing that she would soon die, hospital physicians 
recommended that Baby "K" be provided only comfort care: nu- 
trition, hydration, and warmth, but urged that she not be 
66. See L.M. Kopelman et al., Neonatologists Judge the "Baby Doe" Regula- 
tions, 318 NEW ENG. J. MED. 677, 683 (1988); J.J. Pomerance & T.C. Yu et al., 
Changing Attitudes of Neonatologists Toward Ventilator Support, 8 J. PER- 
INATOLOGY 232, 237 (1988); cf. JEANNE GUILLEMIN & LYNDA HOLMSTROM, IXED 
BLESSINGS: INTENSIVE CARE FOR NEWBORNS 281-82 (1982). 
67. See 45 C.F.R. 1340.1 - 1340.20. 
68. 16 F.3d 590 (4th Cir. 1994), affg and modifying In re Baby "K," 832 F. 
Supp. 1022 (E.D. Va. 1993). 
69. See id. at 590. 
70. See id. at 592. 
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placed on a respirator if she began to experience difficulty in 
breathing, which was a normal outgrowth of her anencephalic 
condition.71 Baby "K'"s mother rejected the physicians' propo- 
sal, and refused to agree to a "Do Not Resuscitate Order."72 In- 
stead, she insisted that Baby "K" receive mechanical 
respiratory support when necessary.73 
As a result of this impasse, the hospital sought to  transfer 
Baby "K" to  another hospital with a pediatric intensive care 
unit, but none was willing to  accept her.74 However, Baby "K" 
progressed, miraculously, to the point that she no longer needed 
acute hospital care, and she was moved to a nursing home.75 
Thereafter, she occasionally suffered severe respiratory distress 
necessitating mechanical respiratory support, which the nurs- 
ing home could not provide.76 Baby "K" would then be brought 
to the original hospital's emergency room, where her mother 
would request respiratory support to  stabilize her breathing, 
which was provided under protest.77 
After Baby "K"'s second emergency room visit, the hospital 
brought suit in the Federal District Court for the Eastern Dis- 
trict of Virginia, seeking a declaratory judgment that it was not 
obligated, under Virginia or federal law, to provide treatment 
that it believed to be futile and therefore ethically inappropri- 
ate.78 The district court ruled in favor of the mother, concluding 
that under 6 504 of the Rehabilitation Act,79 the Americans 
with Disabilities Act (ADA),sO and the Emergency Medical 
Treatment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA),sl the hospital was 
compelled to furnish care to  Baby "K."82 
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the decision 
of the district court, but relied solely on EMTALA for its deci- 
71. See id. at 592-93. 
72. See id. at 593. 
73. See Baby "K," 16 F.3d at 593. 
74. See id. 
75. See id. 
76. See id. 
77. See id. 
78. See Baby "K," 16 F.3d at 593. 
79. 29 U.S.C. 9 794. 
80. 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq. (1998). 
81. 42 U.S.C. 8 1395dd (1998). 
82. See Baby "K," 16 F.3d at 592. 
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sion.83 Thus, the court was able to avoid two trickier questions: 
1) whether under $ 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, an 
anencephalic child was "otherwise qualified despite her 
anencephaly to receive medical treatment from a federally sup- 
ported hospital, and 2) whether such a child was being discrimi- 
nated against because of her disability, in violation of the ADA, 
when the hospital refused to provide respiratory support, which 
would have been provided to a non-anencephalic child who was 
having difficulty breathing. 
The court construed EMTALA in what it deemed a 
"straightforward" manner, holding that EMTALA reflected a 
Congressional mandate that all persons who presented them- 
selves at hospital emergency rooms with a potential emergency 
health condition be given an appropriate medical screening ex- 
amination to determine if a medical emergency existed, and re- 
ceive appropriate stabilizing treatment before admission to  the 
hospital or transfer to another institution for appropriate ~ a r e . 8 ~  
Under this view of EMTALA, once Baby "K" arrived at the hos- 
pital in respiratory distress, the hospital had no alternative but 
to  examine her and provide stabilizing treatment for her 
breathing difficulties. The court found that EMTALA pre- 
empted all state law to the contrary, including medical malprac- 
tice and professional ethics laws.85 
In his dissent, Judge Sprouse expressly voiced concern that 
federal involvement in individual medical treatment decisions 
was inappr~pr ia te ,~~ sounding remarkably like Justice Stevens' 
plurality opinion in Bowen v. The American Hospital Associa- 
t i ~ n . ~ ~  Judge Sprouse voiced disbelief "that Congress, in enact- 
ing EMTALA, meant for the judiciary to superintend the 
sensitive decision-making process between family and physi- 
cians at the bedside of a helpless and terminally ill patient."88 
He observed, "[tlragic end-of-life hospital dramas such as this 
one do not represent phenomena susceptible of uniform legal 
control. . . . Congress, even in its weakest moments, would not 
83. See id. 
84. See id. at 594-95. 
85. See id. at 597. 
86. See Baby "K," 16 F.3d at  598 (Sprouse, S.J., dissenting). 
87. 476 U.S. 610 (1986). 
88. Baby "K," 16 F.3d at 598 (Sprouse, S.J., dissenting). 
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have attempted to impose federal control in this sensitive, pri- 
vate area."89 
At first glance, In re Baby " P O  appears to be a victory for 
parents, and a defeat for physicians and other health care prov- 
iders, because the court held that a parent can insist on provi- 
sion of medical care for a disabled child, even if physicians do 
not wish to provide it. However, other Fourth Circuit EMTALA 
decisions make clear the limited nature of this holding because 
seriously disabled newborns rarely receive treatment in an 
emergency room,g1 and because EMTALA demands treatment 
only when a physician actually determines that a patient is in 
the midst of medical emergency.92 In Baber v. Hospital Corpo- 
ration of America,93 the Fourth Circuit declined to find a viola- 
tion of EMTALA when an emergency room physician refused to 
perform an x-ray or other radiological procedure for an emer- 
gency room patient who hit her head when she fell in the emer- 
gency room, despite her brother's repeated requests.94 The 
patient subsequently died due to an undiagnosed brain injury.95 
Determining that the physician had no reason to believe that 
the patient had suffered a serious injury, nor that there was a 
medical emergency, the court found that EMTALAYs emergency 
screening requirement was not triggered, and thus EMTALA 
had not been violated.96 
In Bryan v. The Rectors and Visitors of the University of 
V i r g i n i ~ , ~ ~  the court held that the duty imposed by EMTALA, to  
stabilize and provide appropriate medical care, did not extend 
beyond the emergency room.98 In a situation akin to that of 
Baby "K," but at the other end of life, physicians who had pro- 
vided respiratory support to  an elderly patient upon her admis- 
sion to  the hospital from its emergency room, declined to  
89. Id. 
90. Id. at 590. 
91. See, e.g., Bryan v. The Rectors and Visitors of the Univ. of Virginia, 95 
F.3d 349, 352 (4th Cir. 1996) (holding that EMTALA did not impose a continuing 
duty to treat after the patient was admitted to the hospital). 
92. See Baber v. Hosp. Corp. of Am., 977 F.2d 872 (4th Cir. 1992). 
93. Id. 
94. See id. a t  874. 
95. See id. a t  875. 
96. See id. a t  885. 
97. 95 F.3d 349 (4th Cir. 1996). 
98. See id. at 349. 
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continue that support when they concluded that further treat- 
ment would be futile, despite the family's wishes to the con- 
trary.99 The court rejected the plaintiff s argument that 
EMTALA imposed a continuing duty to provide medical care 
whenever a patient's life was at stake, and declared instead 
that EMTALA's focus was limited to the emergency room.100 
Thus, the significance of In re Baby "K" appears to be quite 
limited. In re Baby "K" should not be considered a ringing en- 
dorsement of parental rights to insist on treatment of handi- 
capped children. Rather, it reflects the limited, patchwork 
nature of federal regulation of medical treatment decisions, and 
the isolated and sometimes arbitrary impact of federal laws on 
physician autonomy in making treatment decisions. 
The case of Baby Terrylol provides a strikingly different 
view of parental autonomy in making medical decisions for seri- 
ously ill newborns. Baby Terry was born in Michigan in 1993 at  
twenty-three weeks gestational age, suffering from respiratory 
distress and a number of other complications that frequently ac- 
company extreme prematurity.102 He was placed on a respira- 
tor to assist him in breathing, but defied his physicians' 
predictions that he would soon die.103 Because his physicians 
believed that the respirator treatment was merely prolonging 
death, and did not provide a meaningful chance to  recover from 
his many illnesses, they tried to  persuade his parents to  diseon- 
tinue the respirator.lo4 
After the parents refused to  stop treatment, the Genesee 
County Department of Social Services sought a judicial declara- 
tion that the parents were incompetent decision-makers and 
that another person should be substituted as Terry's guard- 
ian.105 Ultimately, the Genesee County Probate Court declared 
99. See id. at 350. 
100. See id. a t  353. 
101. The facts of Baby Terry's case are taken from the Appellant's Brief, In re 
Achtabowski, No. 93-1247-AV (Mich. Cir. Ct. Aug. 12, 1993), cited in James Bopp 
Jr. & Richard E. Coleson, Child Abuse by Whom? Parental Rights and Judicial 
Competency Determinations: The Baby K and Baby Terry Cases, 20 Ohio N.U. L. 
REV. 821, 825 (1994). The author was unable to independently verify these facts 
either through a court opinion or trial transcripts. 
102. See id. 
103. See id. 
104. See id. 
105. See id. at 826, 828. 
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the parents to be specifically incompetent to make medical 
treatment decisions for Baby Terry.lo6 Although no psychologi- 
cal or psychiatric evaluation of the parents was conducted, the 
court apparently believed that because the parents refused to  
accept the doctors' grim prognosis for their son, their judgment 
was so impaired that they could not be considered competent 
decision-makers. The court appointed another relative as Baby 
Terry's guardian.1°7 The guardian declared that it was in Baby 
Terry's best interest to withdraw the respiratory treatment, 
and let him die.lO8 
Baby Terry is a troubling example of judicial and physician 
usurpation of parental authority to make decisions about the 
medical treatment of their children. In this case, the Genesee 
County Probate Court totally ignored the usual presumption 
that parents act in their children's best interest,log which re- 
quires judicial deference, unless the parents' decision is clearly 
erroneous.l10 In failing to distinguish between the question of 
competency (capacity) to make a decision and the merits of that 
decision, the probate court overlooked the presumption that 
parents are the most appropriate decision-makers for their 
child,lll and exalted physician judgment to a pinnacle from 
which it could not be overthrown. At the very least, procedural 
due process demands both that a decision to  supersede parental 
authority be based upon a thorough examination of the parents' 
psychiatric and psychological functioning and that other medi- 
cal opinions on the appropriateness of continuing medical treat- 
ment for a particular child be presented. Further, because of 
the irrevocable nature of the probate court's decision to effec- 
tively terminate parental rights and select a guardian whose 
sole function would be to declare that it was in Baby Terry's 
106. See Bopp & Coleson, supra note 101, a t  826. 
107. See id. 
108. See id. a t  827. After Baby Terry's death, his mother sought review in the 
Michigan Supreme Court, asserting that this was a classic case capable of repeti- 
tion but evading review. See id. The court declined to accept review. See In re 
Achtabowski, 548 N.W.2d 628 (Mich. 1995). 
109. See, e.g., Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Parham v. J.R., 
442 U.S. 584 (1979). 
110. See Parhan v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602-03 (1979). 
111. See id. 
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interest to die, it was incumbent upon the court to stay its deci- 
sion to provide the opportunity for appellate review. 
Baby Terry is clearly aberrational when compared with 
most other cases in which parental authority to make difficult 
medical decisions for their children has been challenged. It is 
significant that in the Baby Doe and University Hospital cases, 
the parents' judgment was supported by at least some physi- 
cians, so that reviewing courts could find the parents' decision 
to be reasonable and decide that federal courts should stay out 
of this type of medical decision-making.112 In contrast, in Baby 
Terry and Baby Andrew, the parents' views were rejected by all 
of the physicians involved.113 In each of these cases, the par- 
ents, who, ironically, were at  opposite ends of the pro- and anti- 
treatment spectrum, were powerless to have their treatment de- 
cisions respected and implemented.114 Baby "K" appears to  be 
unique because even though her mother stood alone in her opin- 
ion that continuing medical treatment was appropriate, Baby 
"R' happened to need that treatment in a situation in which 
EMTALA provided essential protection. These cases suggest 
that our laws provide insufficient support for parental auton- 
omy and authority in making medical decisions on behalf of 
their disabled children. The general rule under our federal and 
state laws, as applied in the last twenty years, is that parents 
are permitted the autonomy and authority to act on behdf of 
their children only when they can find a physician who supports 
their decision, a physician who is in turn constrained by the au- 
thority of the federal government as embodied in the Child 
Abuse Regulations.115 Thus, in reality, American law and 
American courts actually denigrate parental autonomy and au- 
thority in favor of medical and governmental authority. 
VII. Access to Chronic or Outpatient Care 
In addition to  receiving acute health care, usually in the 
hospital setting, children with disabilities frequently face obsta- 
cles in obtaining continuing care, particularly in the least re- 
112. See LYON, supra note 3, at 32, 35; United States v. Univ. Hosp., 729 F.2d 
144, 146 (2d Cir. 1984). 
113. See supra text accompanying notes 21-22, 101-108. 
114. See id. 
115. 45 C.F.R. 5 1340.1 - 1340.20. 
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strictive setting possible. Four recent cases may change this: 
two interpreting the Americans with Disabilities Actl16 and two 
reviewing challenges to regulations promulgated under the 
Medicaid Act.l17 The ADA was enacted to expand the reach of 
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, in order to more fully integrate 
disabled Americans into the mainstream of social and economic 
life.118 Title I1 of the ADA imposes a prohibition against dis- 
crimination on the basis of disability on all arms of state gov- 
ernment, including state funded programs for health 
services.119 Title I11 of the ADA imposes a requirement of non- 
discrimination on all places of public accommodation, including 
hospitals and physicians' offices.120 
In Helen L. v. DiDario,l21 the Third Circuit Court of Ap- 
peals held that the ADA required the Pennsylvania Department 
of Public Welfare to provide supportive services to  a disabled 
woman in a non-institutionalized setting.122 The plaintiff, Idell 
S., was a forty-three-year-old woman who was paralyzed from 
the waist down.123 She required some assistance with the activ- 
ities of daily living, and was eligible for assistance from the De- 
partment of Public Welfare because she was indigent.124 The 
Department provided such services in two programs: a nursing 
home residence program, funded through Medicaid at an an- 
nual cost of $45,000, and an attendant care program, which pro- 
vided the same services to people in their own homes, at an 
annual cost of $10,500.125 Due to the way the Pennsylvania leg- 
islature had organized and funded these two programs, there 
was space for Ms. S. only in the more expensive nursing home 
~ r 0 g r a m . l ~ ~  In the nursing home, Ms. S. was surrounded by dis- 
116. See Bragdon v. Abbott, 118 S. Ct. 2196 (1998); Helen L. v. DiDario, 46 
F.3d 325 (3d Cir. 1995). Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. $ 12101 et seq. 
(1998). 
117. See Detsel v. Sullivan, 895 F.2d 58 (2d Cir. 1990); Skubel v. Fuoroli, 113 
F.3d 330 (2d Cir. 1997). Medicaid Act, 42 U.S.C. $ 1396a et seq. (1998). 
118. See Helen L., 46 F.3d a t  331 (citing S. REP. NO. 116, lOlst Cong., 1st 
Sess. 20 (1989), H.R. REP. NO. 485 11, lOlst Cong., 2d Sess. 50 (1990)). 
119. See 42 U.S.C. $4 12131-12134 (1997). 
120. See 42 U.S.C. $3 12181 - 12189 (1995). 
121. 46 F.3d 325. 
122. See id. a t  325. 
123. See id. a t  328. 
124. See id. 
125. See id. at 329. 
126. See Helen L., 46 F.3d at 329. 
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abled individuals, isolated from friends in the community, and 
unable to care for her two adolescent children.127 She sued the 
Department of Public Welfare, arguing that its failure to pro- 
vide the services for which she was eligible in the less restric- 
tive setting of her home violated the ADA, because it prevented 
her from being integrated into the mainstream of society to the 
fullest extent possible.128 
The Third Circuit agreed, ruling that "the unnecessary seg- 
regation of individuals with disabilities in the provision of pub- 
lic services is itself a form of discrimination within the meaning 
of" the ADA and 9 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.129 The court 
further held that under these statutes, "a public entity shall 
make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or proce- 
dures when the modifications are necessary to avoid discrimina- 
tion on the basis of disability, unless the public entity can 
demonstrate that making the modifications would fundamen- 
tally alter the nature of the service, program, or activity."l30 In 
this case, the court found that it was entirely reasonable for the 
Department of Public Welfare to  modify its programs for per- 
sons with disabilities who needed assistance with the activities 
of daily living to provide more spaces in its attendant care pro- 
grarn.l3l Since the program's avowed goal was to "enable 
[adults]. . . to live in their own homes and communities," requir- 
ing the Department to provide health care services for addi- 
tional people would not alter the fundamental nature of the 
program, and it would cost less to enroll more people like Ms. 
Idell S. in the attendant care pr0gram.13~ 
The reasoning of Helen L. v. DiDario,l33 if widely ac- 
~epted,l3~ would have far-reaching implications for the provi- 
sion of services for disabled children. No longer could states 
and the federal government, the primary payors for services for 
127. See id. at 329. 
128. See id. 
129. Id. at 33. 
130. Id. at 336-37 (citing 28 C.F.R. 5 35.130(b)(7)). 
131. See Helen L. 46 F.3d at 337. 
132. Id. at 337-38. 
133. 46 F.3d 325. 
134. The wide reach of Title I1 of the ADA was recently recognized b y  the 
Supreme Court in Pennsylvania Dep't of Corrections v. Yeskey, 118 S .  Ct .  1952 
(1998) (holding, on appeal from the Third Circuit, that Title I1 of the ADA applies 
to a state's department of corrections). 
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disabled children, insist that the price for receiving a broad 
package of services is living in an institution. Instead, author- 
ity to decide where services are to be provided would be shifted 
from the government to the parents, who are in a better position 
to  know their children's needs as well as their strengths. Giv- 
ing parents the authority and autonomy to decide that such 
services are required to  be provided in the children's home or in 
an out-patient setting, would greatly enhance disabled chil- 
dren's ability to be fully integrated into the life of their family, 
school, and community. 
Two cases from the Second Circuit Court of Appeals have a 
similar potential for expanding disabled children's integration 
into the community, through avoiding the Procrustean bed of 
Medicaid Regulations. Detsel v. S u l l i ~ a n l ~ ~  and Skubel v. Sulli- 
van136 invalidated HHS regulations under the Medicaid Act,lS7 
which effectively confined disabled children to their homes as 
the price of receiving nursing services under the Medicaid Act. 
In Detsel, the Second Circuit held that the Secretary's interpre- 
tation of the Medicaid regulations as denying coverage for pri- 
vate duty nursing for a severely disabled child while she was 
attending school, while covering identical services if they were 
provided while the child was receiving private tutoring at 
home,l38 was an unreasonable construction of congressional in- 
tent in regard to Medicaid.139 The court stressed that Congress 
had "created the Medicaid program in part to  assist states in 
providing 'rehabilitation and other services to help [recipients] 
attain or retain capability for independence or self-care."'140 In 
later amendments to the Medicaid Act, Congress was particu- 
larly concerned about identifying and removing "'barriers that 
prevent the provision of appropriate care in a home or commu- 
nity setting to meet the special needs of technology-dependent 
'6 ' children."'l41 Congress was also concerned about recom- 
mend[ingl changes in private and public health care programs 
135. 895 F.2d 58 (2d Cir. 1990). 
136. 113 F.3d 330 (2d Cir. 1997). 
137. 42 U.S.C. 5 1396a et seq. (1998). 
138. See 42 C.F.R. 5 440.80 (1997). 
139. See Detsel, 895 F.2d at 63-64. 
140. Id. at 62 (quoting 42 U.S.C. 5 1396(a)(19)). 
141. Id. (quoting Pub. L. No. 99-272, 5 952D (1986) (current version at 42 
U.S.C. 5 1396a, note (1998))). 
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so as to  provide home and community-based alternatives to  the 
institutionalization of technology-based children.'"l42 While at 
the time that the Medicaid Act was adopted, few, if any technol- 
ogy dependent children could live at  home, the court found that 
that was no reason to enshrine an outdated medical perspective 
in regulations.143 
In Skubel v. Sullivan,l44 the Second Circuit applied similar 
reasoning to Medicaid home health nursing regulations.145 
These regulations required that home health nursing services 
be provided only in a Medicaid recipient's home, and not in an 
alternative setting, such as a school.146 The effect of these regu- 
lations was to keep children out of public school and in their 
homes. As in Detsel, the court in Skubel invalidated these regu- 
lations as an unreasonable interpretation of the Medicaid 
Act .I47 
Taken together, Detsel and Skubel demonstrate the impor- 
tance of dedicated and persistent advocacy on the part of par- 
ents of disabled children, to  challenge arbitrary and rigid 
interpretations of laws which are supposed to expand access to 
health care services, but in fact frustrate efforts to provide these 
services in a way which enhances disabled children's indepen- 
dence and integration into the wider community. These cases 
also transfer authority from the government to parents to de- 
cide what is in a particular child's best interest. 
Bragdon v. Abbottl48 is a Supreme Court case with broad 
implications for access to care for people with disabilities. The 
specific issue in Bragdon was whether asymptomatic HIV infec- 
tion was a disability within the meaning of the ADA, which out- 
laws discriminatory treatment by places of public 
accommodation, including hospitals and physicians' offices.149 
Sidney Abbott visited a dentist, Dr. Bragdon, for a routine fill- 
ing of a cavity.150 When Dr. Bragdon learned that Ms. Abbott 
142. Id. 
143. See Detsel, 895 F.2d at 65. 
144. 113 F.3d 330 (2d Cir. 1997). 
145. See id. at 336-37. 
146. See 42 C.F.R. 4 440.70 (a)(l) (1997). 
147. See Skubel, 113 F.3d at 337. 
148. 118 S. Ct. 2196 (1998). 
149. See id. at 2200. 
150. See id. at 2201. 
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was HIV positive, he refused to treat her, except in a hospital, 
where the costs of treatment would be higher.lS1 Abbott de- 
clined, and instead sued Bragdon under Maine antidiscrimina- 
tion law and the ADA.1S2 
The United States District Court for the District of 
MaineY153 the First Circuit Court of Appeals,lS4 and the 
Supreme Court155 all agreed that asymptomatic HIV infection 
was a physical impairment of the reproductive system that lim- 
ited Ms. Abbott in a major life activity, to wit, reproduction. 
The Supreme Court expressly rejected the argument that the 
only life activities which merit protection under the ADA are 
those which have a "public, economic, or daily character."l56 
Since Ms. Abbott might reasonably choose not to  risk infecting a 
sexual partner or a fetus in utero, her reproductive capacity was 
substantially limited. The Court found that the ADA definition 
of disability does "not turn on personal choice."l57 As long as 
Ms. Abbott's HIV infection substantially limited her ability to 
reproduce, she was disabled within the meaning of the ADA.158 
The Court remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for fur- 
ther determination of whether her disability could be reason- 
ably accommodated, in light of the significant risk of 
transmission of HIV to Dr. Bragdon, which could not be elimi- 
nated through the use of appropriate precautions.l59 
The significance of Bragdon for children with disabilities is 
profound. By holding that persons with disabilities must be af- 
forded equal access to necessary medical care, the Supreme 
Court effectuates the ADA's goal of ensuring full integration of 
persons with disabilities into the mainstream of American life, 
and potentially enhances parental authority to seek services for 
their disabled children as they see fit. No longer can children 
with HIV and other physical and mental disabilities be steered 
routinely into specialty practices and clinics for those with par- 
151. See id. 
152. See id. 
153. See Abbott v. Bragdon, 912 F. Supp. 580 (D. Me. 1995). 
154. See Abbott v. Bragdon, 107 F.3d 934 (1st Cir. 1996). 
155. See Bragdon, 118 S .  Ct. 2196. 
156. Id. at 2205. 
157. Id. at 2206. 
158. See id. at 2207. 
159. See id. at 2213. 
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ticular disabilities.160 Instead, they must be given access to 
treatment by mainstream providers, who must reasonably ac- 
commodate a child's particular disability.161 Necessary accom- 
modations include wheelchair accessibility, sign language 
interpretation, and the use of universal precautions to prevent 
the spread of infectious diseases.162 
VIII. The Supplemental Security Income Program: Access to 
Medicaid and Money 
A crucial part of access to health care services for many 
children with disabilities is their ability to receive cash assist- 
ance and their eligibility for Medicaid services under the Sup- 
plemental Security Income Program.163 Under this program, 
many children living at or below the poverty level can receive 
cash for habilitative devices and services which they might not 
be able to receive under a narrow definition of "medically neces- 
sary," and which they could not otherwise afford.164 In addition, 
if children are determined to  be disabled for the purposes of the 
SSI program, they automatically become eligible to  receive 
Medicaid, which guarantees them access to medical care.165 
The landmark Supreme Court case of Sullivan v. Zebley166 
provides critical background to the current controversy about 
chiidren's eligibility for SSI benefits cases. Brian Zebley, a dis- 
160. Although, many times, children with disabilities will not seek care from 
specialized providers who are experts at treating their particular illness or condi- 
tion. However, it does suggest, particularly when viewed in conjunction with 
Helen L. v. DiDario, 46 F.3d 325 (3d Cir. 1995) and Pennsylvania Department of 
Corrections v. Yeskey, 118 U.S. 1952 (19981, that neither private health care pro- 
fessionals nor state funded medical and habilitative service providers can insist 
that disabled children visit only "high risk" practitioners or disability specialists, if 
that is not what the children or their parents want. 
161. Indeed, safeguards to secure access to health care for persons with disa- 
bilities is mandated as part of the effort to move more indigent individuals into 
Medicaid managed care plans. In New York, for example, health plans must 
demonstrate how they will comply with the ADA as a condition of acceptance as a 
Medicaid managed care provider. See New York State Dep't of Health, Guidelines 
for Medicaid MCO Compliance with the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 
Oct. 27, 1997. 
162. See id. 
163. 42 U.S.C. 3 1381 et seq. (1998). 
164. See Piori, supra note 11, at Al.  
165. See supra notes 9-17 and accompanying text. 
166. 493 U.S. 521 (1990). 
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abled child, brought a class action suit against Louis Sullivan, 
the Secretary of HHS, challenging Social Security regulations. 
The regulations treated disabled adults and children differently 
in terms of their ability to qualify for the SSI ~ r 0 g r a m . l ~ ~  The 
Social Security Administration (SSA) required adult claimants 
to show that they were unable to find substantial gainful em- 
ployment due to  a disability.168 Adults were presumed disabled 
if they suffered from a listed medical condition that was severe 
enough to prevent them from obtaining substantial gainful em- 
ployment.l69 In addition, adults who did not meet the enumer- 
ated medical conditions could still be found disabled if an 
individualized assessment showed that they were unable to do 
their own past work or any other work available in the national 
economy.170 Approximately one quarter of all adults who quali- 
fied for SSI benefits were found eligible under this individual- 
ized review process.171 
In contrast, the SSI regulations for children with disabili- 
ties failed to implement the statutory mandate that children 
should be deemed disabled if they had a condition comparable 
in severity to those that would prevent an adult from working, 
since the regulations failed to provide a similar, individualized 
opportunity for children to demonstrate a disability of "compa- 
rable severity."172 The Supreme Court struck down these regu- 
lations as inconsistent with the statute, which in effect required 
the Secretary of HHS to promulgate new regulations that pro- 
vided for an individualized functional assessment of a child- 
claimant's physical or mental impairments, and would evaluate 
the impact of those impairments on the normal activities of a 
child the claimant's age.173 
The new regulations required a child to show either a disa- 
bility that met enumerated medical criteria, or, pursuant to an 
167. See id. at 526. 
168. See id. at 533. 
169. Indeed, the list of medical conditions in the regulations was deliberately 
designed to require a higher level of severity than mandated by the statute. The 
regulations were so stringent that a person whose disabilities matched one of the 
listed conditions would not be able to work at all. See id. at 532-33. 
170. See id. at 534-35. 
171. See Sullivan, 493 U.S. at 535, n. 15. 
172. Id., 493 U.S. at 535-36. 
173. See id. at 541. 
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individualized functional assessment, that he or she was se- 
verely impaired in one area of functioning, markedly impaired 
in two areas of functioning, or moderately impaired in three ar- 
eas of functioning.174 In practice, these regulations resulted in a 
huge increase in the number of children who were receiving SSI 
and Medicaid because of their disabilities, and greatly in- 
creased the costs of the SSI and Medicaid programs. 
In the mid-1990's, Congress was besieged with media sto- 
ries suggesting that some children were feigning disabilities, as 
well as concerns that the regulations defined disability so 
broadly that many children without serious disabilities were re- 
ceiving benefits.175 As part of a broad program of "welfare re- 
form," Congress enacted the Personal Responsibility and Work 
Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996.176 The Act eliminated 
the parallel treatment of disabled children and adults.177 
Rather than defining disability for children to encompass those 
children whose impairments were of "comparable severity" to 
adults whose disability precluded them from attaining substan- 
tial gainful employment, the Act redefined disability to include 
only those children whose mental or physical impairments re- 
sulted in "marked and severe functional limitations," which 
could be expected to last at least one year.l78 In addition, the 
Act mandated two major changes in implementing regulations 
which also excluded many children who had previously been 
classified as disabled.lT9 The first was to rewrite the medical 
criteria for mental and emotional disorders "to eliminate refer- 
ences to  maladaptive behavior in the domain of personallbehav- 
ioral function,"l80 which would preclude a finding of disability 
for many children with Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder 
and other mental illnesses. The second change was even more 
sweeping, as Congress eliminated individualized functional as- 
-- - - 
174. Cf Supplemental Security Income; Determining Disability for a Child 
Under Age 18; Interim Final Rules With Request for Comments, 62 Fed. Reg. 
6408, 6409 (1997) (to be codified at 20 C.F.R. pts. 404 and 416). 
175. See Doolittle, supra note 1, at 39. 
176. Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996). 
177. See id. Q 211(a)(4)(1). 
178. Id. Q 211(a)(4)(i). 
179. See id. Q 211(b)(l) and (2). 
180. Id. Q 211(b)(l). 
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sessments for children who did not meet the listed medical con- 
ditions,lsl as had been required by Zebley.l82 
These changes in the disability program for children were 
expected to save nearly $5 billion in the SSI program over a six 
year period, and $1.2 billion in federal and state Medicaid costs 
over the same time frame.l83 As a result of this drastic rewrit- 
ing of federal disability law,l84 it was estimated that as many as 
315,000 children, many of whom were significantly impaired, 
would either lose their current SSI and Medicaid benefits or be 
declared ineligible to receive them if they applied.185 
In January 1997, the SSA began its redetermination pro- 
cess, mailing letters to the parents of more than 270,000 chil- 
dren informing them that the SSA would review their child's 
eligibility for SSI.ls6 This review process focused on those chil- 
dren who had been deemed eligible for SSI benefits based on an 
individualized functional assessment, and began with children 
whose disability had in part been expressed in maladaptive 
behavior. la7 
In the first few months of this review, more than half the 
children whose eligibility was reconsidered had their benefits 
denied.188 Preliminary data showed wide variations among 
states in the proportion of children removed from SSI r01ls.l~~ 
Many children's advocacy groups identified significant numbers 
of severely disabled children who had been cut from the SSI 
181. See Pub. L. No. 104-193, 211(b)(2). 
182. See Sullivan v. Zebley, 493 U.S. 521 (1990). 
183. See Supplemental Security Income; Determining Disability for a Child 
Under Age 18; Interim Final Rules With Request for Comments, 62 Fed. Reg. 
6408, 6417 (1997) (to be codified a t  20 CFR pts. 404 and 416). 
184. Under the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation 
Act of 1996, the new definition of disability and new evaluation process for chil- 
dren with disabilities was to apply to all claims filed on or after August 22, 1996, 
and to all claims not yet finally adjudicated by that date, including all cases in 
various stages of appeal. See 104 Pub. L. No. 193, 211(d), 110 Stat. 2105, 2190 
(1996); see also Social Security Administration (SSA): Statement of Regulatory Pri- 
orities," 62 Fed. Reg. 57189, 57193 (1997). 
185. See Doolittle, supra note 1, at 35. However, the Balanced Budget Act of 
1997 restored Medicaid entitlement for children who had previously received it by 
virtue of their SSI eligibility. See id. at 40. 
186. See id. a t  39. 
187. See id. 
188. See id. 
189. See Doolittle, supra note 1, at 37. 
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rolls. When these cases received media attention, there was a 
huge public and legislative outcry. In order to assist parents 
whose children's eligibility for SSI would have to be redeter- 
mined under the new law, in 1996 the American Bar Associa- 
tion launched a pro bono advocacy program, the SSI Children's 
Project, to connect families with lawyers who represent them in 
the redetermination process.lgO The ABA has also provided an 
important voice insisting that children receive a full and fair 
hearing. lgl 
In response, the Social Security Administration ordered a 
"top to  bottom" review of its procedures. In February 1998, 
78,000 children (and their families), whose appeals had been de- 
nied, were given notice of their ability to appeal these denials 
and were specifically advised that they could petition for bene- 
fits pending appeal.lg2 Nonetheless, there continue to  be dispar- 
ities among the states in their rates of removing children from 
SSI eligibility and many advocates for disabled children are still 
concerned that children are improperly being denied SSI bene- 
fits.lg3 More than 147,000 children were cut from the SSI by 
March of 1998, with 82% of them suffering from mental retarda- 
tion or mental disorders.194 Whether many of these children 
will have their SSI benefits restored after their case is reheard 
remains to be seen. The ultimate societal impact of leaving a 
large number of mentaiiy disabled children without necessary 
treatment and supportive services is problematic, and the deci- 
sion to remove these children from the SSI program, while fis- 
cally attractive in the short-run, appears extremely unsound 
over the long term. 
190. See ABA Urges the Social Security Administration to Correct Continuing 
Problems in SSZ Cutoff for Disabled Children, (last modified Jan. 5, 1999) http:// 
www.abanet.org/media/news.html>. 
191. See id. 
192. See Bazelon Center for Mental Health Law (hereinafter Bazelon), Chil- 
dren's SSZ Update (visited June 22, 1998) <http://www.bazelon.org/ssiupdat. 
html>. 
193. See ABA Urges the Social Security Administration to Correct Continuing 
Problems in SSZ Cutoff for Disabled Children (visited July 24, 1998) <http:/f 
www.abanet.org/media/news.html>. 
194. See Bazelon, supra note 192. 
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M. Conclusion 
Children with disabilities continue in an uphill battle to 
gain access to  necessary health care. Their parents' ability to 
advocate effectively on their behalf is frequently constrained by 
poverty, as well as by narrow and medically based criteria for 
eligibility for supportive services. Further, in both chronic and 
acute care settings, twenty-five years of judicial precedent, stat- 
utes, and regulations have diminished the authority of all par- 
ents to make treatment choices which they believe are in their 
child's best interest, and denied parents a zone of autonomy in 
which to make those choices. The right of parents to  make med- 
ical decisions for their children, a staple of our common law her- 
itage, has become a vestigial illusion, with parents having the 
authority to decide what is necessary treatment for their chil- 
dren only if physicians and the federal government concur. 
Although cases of medical neglect and abuse do occur, it is im- 
portant that a parent not be charged with child abuse or being 
an unfit parent simply because physicians disagree with the 
parent's reasoning. As medicine and technology continue to ex- 
pand opportunities for disabled children to reach their full po- 
tential, it is critical that parents be given the authority and 
autonomy to chart the course for their children that appears 
wisest to them. 
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